Exploiting Policies in an Open Infrastructure for Lifelong Learning by De Coi, Juri L. et al.
Exploiting Policies in an Open Infrastructure for
Lifelong Learning
Juri L. De Coi, Philipp Ka¨rger, Arne W. Koesling, and Daniel Olmedilla
L3S Research Center and Leibniz University of Hannover, Hannover, Germany
{decoi,kaerger,koesling,olmedilla}@L3S.de
Abstract. Nowadays, people are in need for continuous learning in order
to keep up to date or be upgraded in their job. An infrastructure for
lifelong learning requires continuous adaptation to learners needs and
must also provide flexible ways for students to use and personalize them.
Controlling who can access a document, specifying when a student may
be contacted for interactive instant messaging or periodical reminders in
order to increase motivation for collaboration are just some examples of
typical statements that may be specified by e.g., learners and learning
management system administrators. This paper shows how policies can
represent a way of expressing these statements and describes the extra
benefits of its adoption like flexibility, dynamicity and interoperability.
1 Introduction
Society and current labor market evolves rapidly. Nowadays, a learner is poten-
tially any person in the world, who wants to keep up to date on any specific topic,
be it at work or in any other facet of her life. Therefore, there is a growing need
for more flexible and cost-effective solutions for learners allowing them to study
at different locations (e.g., at home) and at times that are better arranged with
their working hours. In addition, learners do not necessarily work isolated but
may collaborate with or contact other persons, like learners or tutors. Systems
addressing these requirements must allow users to have a big flexibility in the
way they use the system, how they collaborate, how they share their content,
etc. Controlling who can access a document, specifying when a student may be
contacted for interactive instant messaging or periodical reminders in order to
increase motivation for collaboration are just some examples of typical state-
ments that may be specified by e.g., learners and learning management system
administrators. Policies represent an appropriate way for expressing this kind
of statements because of their flexibility and dynamicity as well as their ease of
use (they are typically declarative, that is, users specify “what” to do but not
“how” something is to be done, therefore making its use more accessible to e.g.,
learners). Furthermore, lately there has been extensive research, that provides
not only the ability of specifying these statements but also advanced mechanisms
for reasoning on, exchanging and exploiting them.
This paper focuses on the use of policies, a well-defined declarative and dy-
namic approach in order to specify and control the behavior of complex and
rapidly evolving infrastructures for lifelong learning. First, Section 2 identifies
example situations in which the specification of policies would increase the flex-
ibility of the interactions and collaborations as well as enhance the learners
experience. These examples show that dynamicity and ease of use, are a crucial
requirement, both being two of the main characteristics of policies. The benefits
of the integration of policies into learning management systems and personal
learner agents in order to support such situations are described in Section 3, as
well as the out-of-the-box benefits of their exploitation. In addition, Section 4 an-
alyzes existing policy languages and frameworks in order to present an overview
of available solutions to the reader. It provides a comparison of their main fea-
tures as well as their advantages and disadvantages from the perspective of their
integration into lifelong learning infrastructures. Later, Section 5 exemplifies the
formalization of policies using a selected policy language and describes some
of the added benefits of its use such as negotiations and advanced explanations.
Finally, related work is presented in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Motivation Scenario
Alice holds a master degree in computer science and works successfully in a
company. Recently, she was assigned the task of managing a new project starting
in a couple of months and therefore she would need to learn and refresh her
knowledge on project management. Since she has a full time job including many
business trips, she uses an on-line learning client that allows her to improve her
competences whenever she has some available time. With this learning client she
is able to collaborate and to send questions or answers to other learners or tutors,
and therefore she is able to chat with other students and even participate in a
social network. However, since she uses her chat tool also for her job she restricts
her chat facility in a way that during working time only business contacts and
other employees of her company can start a conversation therefore allowing other
students to contact her only in her leisure time. Of course, students trying to
contact her during working time get a brief explanation of why a conversation is
not possible at that very moment and which even indicates when Alice can be
contacted.
Within the program Alice is following, she accesses different learning activ-
ities and objects through her learning client. Some of this material is free of
charge but a couple of learning activities she is interested in are offered each one
by a different content provider that sells it. Since the material is sold on a good
price, she decides to purchase it. Each provider tells Alice that either she has to
have an account or she has to provide a credit card for payment of the learn-
ing activity. For the first provider she does have an account and provides her
username and password. Therefore she retrieves the requested material. How-
ever, she does not know the second provider and she must disclose her credit
card. Alice protected her credit card in a way that it would only be disclosed to
providers she may trust and the learning client provides a mechanism by which
a content provider and Alice can trust each other even if they have not had any
transaction in common before.
The learning client Alice is using allows her to share exercises and other rel-
evant documents stored in her computer (e.g., using a peer-to-peer network [12,
10]) with other students following the same program or within the same learn-
ing network. She may even create some new material out of what she learned
and her experience at work. She specifies which documents are to be shared and
which conditions other student must fulfill in order to be able to retrieve it (e.g.,
be part of same program or be a tutor). In order to ensure the success of the
students, the learning client includes a personalizable agent. Among other uses
for this agent, Alice can create some guidelines in a way that the agent reminds
her when she has to finish some learning activities or sends her an e-mail when
she has been inactive for more than a week. Tutors can also attach these kinds
of rules to the learning activities or programs in order to motivate their students
or even to define some guidelines for on-line games that will be followed by their
students [11]. Thanks to all these flexible facilities and all their personalization
and configuration possibilities Alice is able to finish her program successfully.
Fig. 1. Example policies in an open and flexible lifelong learning infrastructure
3 Using Policies for Lifelong Learning
The term policy is generally defined as “statement specifying the behavior of a
system” and it is intended to guide decisions and actions. Policies are encoun-
tered in many real world situations in our daily life like, for instance, shops
may have a non return policy, with an exception for the week after Christmas,
when a lot of unwanted items are returned. However, with the digital era, the
specification of policies has emerged in many web-related contexts and software
systems. E-mail clients filters are a specific kind of policy. One of the main ap-
plication areas where policies have been lately used is security, privacy and the
business domain (business rules). Policies yield many advantages compared to
other conventional approaches. To mention some of them, policies are dynamic
(and therefore can be easily change without recompiling the system that uses
them), declarative (a step from the programmer closer to the user of a system
since they state what to be done and not how it is to be done) and they typi-
cally have well-defined semantics and therefore they are easily exchangeable and
understood by other parties, they usually allow reasoning over them (allowing
to infer knowledge and not only explicit knowledge).
Considering the example from above (see also Figure 1), policies can support
Alice in the situations described bringing in all the benefits of its use. Alice may
formulate her personal preferences as a set of policies, for instance, her working
hours or leisure time, as well as whom she considers as business contact or as
a friend. Even a more powerful situation arises when Alice communicates with
other parties. In our example, Alice uses the learning client to access content
providers and receive access information or payment methods in a way her system
can understand and process. Or she may easily define sophisticated methods
to control who accesses the resources she has locally stored in her computer.
In this situation, policies allow users and systems to characterize new users
or systems by their properties and not simply by their identity (crucial in an
open environment where completely strangers may interact with each other).
For example, content providers may provide discount to students of a university
(without having to know and update the whole list of students registered at the
university) or Alice specifying that any user of a community she is in can access
some of the resources in her computer or to whom she would disclose her credit
card. Even negotiations can be (semi)automatically performed among entities
driven by their policies [16].
Furthermore, policies can be used to control the behavior of software agents in
order to send notifications, drive electronic games and simulations for educational
purposes or many other approaches in order to increase her motivation while
learning. All in all, policies have the potential to enhance the possibilities an
open infrastructure offers while increasing its flexibility and ease of use.
4 Comparison of existing Policy Languages
This section first extracts requirements from our running example and identifies
the features a policy framework should meet in order to address them. Then, it
compares existing frameworks based on these features. The scenario presented
above exploits policies in several ways like for example restrictions stated by
Alice for incoming chat connections or conditions under which her locally stored
resources (either documents or her credit card number) may be disclosed, content
providers specifying whether a resource is free-of-charge or at cost (and the
payment methods together with business rules like e.g., discounts) or general
statements indicating how some entity (e.g., a software agent) should react to
a specific event. An open lifelong learning infrastructure must provide sufficient
functionalities in order to support all these situations. The following is a list of
the most important features identified:
Positive vs. negative authorization: policies specifying conditions under which
resources can be accessed may be of two types: positive or negative. Posi-
tive authorization policies specify that if the conditions are satisfied access
is granted (e.g., “business contacts may start a conversation at any time”)
while negative authorization policies specify that if the conditions are satis-
fied access is denied (e.g., “if it is working time disallow students to contact
Alice”). Although one may think that these two kinds of policies retain the
natural way people express policies, it can be argued that the specification
of negative authorizations complicates the enforcement of access control in
a system [4] and adds the extra complexity of having to define metapolicies,
that is, in case two policies conflict (one policy grants access and another
denies it) a statement should specify which final decision is taken. Further-
more, this situation is scenario dependent. When dealing with security and
access control, a typical approach is assuming that access to any resource is
denied by default and only positive authorization policies are defined stating
which resources are allowed [7, 2]. The reason is that if there exists an error
in a policy, the cost of disclosing a sensitive resource is much higher than
the cost of not disclosing a non-sensitive one.
Evaluation: it is important to allow policies to be private, that is, they are not
disclosed unless some conditions are fulfilled. The reason is that policies may
be sensitive. Imagine, Alice states that her friends can contact her via chat
but not any of her business contacts. Most probably Alice does not want her
business contacts to see this policy. Therefore, it is important to distinguish
how policy evaluation is performed in different frameworks. Some of them
assume that policies from different parties can be collected in a centralized
place where a local algorithm is performed while other frameworks allow each
entity to keep control of its policies without disclosing them to any other
party and the algorithm for policy exchange and evaluation is distributed.
Negotiations: directly related to the previous requirement, the support for ne-
gotiations is another desirable feature in lifelong learning. Entities should
be able to exchange policies with other entities at runtime. Since some poli-
cies may be private it may lead to negotiations like the on-line transaction
between Alice and the content provider asking for her credit card1.
Explanations: It should be possible to generate explanations out of the poli-
cies. On the one hand, they help a user to check whether the policies she
created are correct and, on the other hand, they inform other users about
why a decision was taken (or how the users can change the decision by per-
forming a specific action). For example, if a student tries to contact Alice
during her working time, that student would rather appreciate receiving a
message like “I am not available from 8:00am to 5:00pm” instead of “I am not
available”. Or if Alice discloses her credit card number to a content provider
and it is not accepted a message like “This credit card is invalid because it
is expired” would be more useful than simply “Invalid credit card”.
Strong/lightweight evidences: in many cases, entities have to provide in-
formation in order to satisfy other entities’ policies. In some cases, these
properties need to be proved (e.g., Alice’s credit card or her student card
number should be digitally signed for the content provider to accept it) and
sometimes such strong evidence is not needed (e.g., Alice providing her e-
mail address to the same content provider). It is important that a policy
framework allows for both kinds of evidences.
Ontologies: as stated above, policies will be exchanged among entities within
the lifelong learning infrastructure. Although the basic constructs may be
defined in the policy language (e.g., rule structure and semantics), policies
may be used in different applications and even define new concepts. Ontolo-
gies help to provide well-defined semantics for new concepts to be understood
by different entities.
To date many policy languages have been developed. Among the most popu-
lar ones we can include KAoS [15], PeerTrust [7], Ponder [4], Protune [2], Rei [9],
WSPL [1] and XACML [13]. The number and variety of languages is justified
by the different requirements they were designed to accomplish. Ponder allows
for local security policy specification and the description of security manage-
ment activities like registration of users or logging and audit events to be used
in the context of firewalls, operating systems or databases. WSPL’s name itself
(namely Web-Services Policy Language) suggests its goal: supporting description
and control of various aspects and features of a web service. Web services are ad-
dressed by KAoS too, as well as general-purpose grid computing authorization,
although it was originally oriented to software agent applications (where dynamic
runtime policy changes need to be supported). PeerTrust provided a simple but
powerful language for performing negotiations on the Web, in peer-to-peer net-
works and on the grid, based on distributed query evaluations. Rei’s design was
primarily concerned with supporting pervasive computing applications in which
people and devices are mobile and use wireless networking technologies to dis-
cover and access services and devices). Protune’s broad notion of policy aims at
1 Alice may require the content provider to provide a credential of the “Better Busi-
ness Bureau” before she discloses her credit card, therefore leading to an iterative
disclosure of policies and/or credentials
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addressing any general application scenario, including e.g., trust management,
security and privacy policies, business rules and quality of service specifications.
Finally XACML was meant to be a standard general purpose access control
policy language, ideally suitable to the needs of most authorization systems.
As shown in Table 4, Ponder, Rei, PeerTrust and Protune support delegation
but only PeerTrust and Protune also allow for negotiations and both strong and
lightweight evidences. However, Protune is the only policy language also support-
ing advanced explanation mechanisms and seems to be one the most complete
language (as it is also demonstrated in [5]). On the other hand, Protune assumes
by default that resources are private, therefore not allowing for the specification
of negative authorizations, which is a feature supported by other frameworks like
Rei or KAoS. However, Protune does not only allow for distributed evaluation
of policies (therefore allowing policies to be kept private), but also open source
implementations are available, making it easily accessible, usable and extendible.
5 Formalizing Policies in an Open Infrastructure
Previous sections describe the benefits obtained from the use of policies in an
open system. In addition, they provide a description of some of the most im-
portant policy languages defined to date. In this section, we select the Protune
policy language and, after a brief introduction to the language, we materialize
some of the policies described in natural language in section 2 and present some
of the added benefits that they provide, namely explanations and negotiations.
5.1 Protune language
In this section a brief overview of the Protune language is provided. Only the
features which are required in order to support the scenarios we are interested in
are described here. For an overall view of the language, as well as for a thorough
description of its syntax and semantics see [2].
The Protune policy language is based on normal logic program rules
A← L1, . . . , Ln.
whereA is a standard logical atom (called the head of the rule) and L1, . . . , Ln
(the body of the rule) are literals, that is, Li equals either Bi or ¬Bi, for some
logical atom Bi.
In addition to usual Logic Programming-based languages, Protune provides
support to actions, evidences and metapredicates.
Actions Protune allows to specify actions within a policy: typical examples of
actions are sending evidences, accessing legacy systems (e.g., a database)
or environmental properties (e.g., time). Actions are represented as usual
predicates (called provisional predicates). Provisional predicates hold if they
have been successfully executed
Evidences Protune allows to refer to evidences (i.e., credentials and declara-
tions) from within a policy. Evidences can be regarded as a set of property-
value pairs associated to an identifier. Each property-value pair is represented
according to an object oriented-like dot notation id.property : value
Metapredicates Protune allows to define predicate properties. A metapredi-
cate is a predicate associated with property-value pairs. They are represented
through a notation close to the one used for evidences, namely predicate→
property : value. Rules containing metapredicates are called metarules.
Metarules are typically exploited to assert some information about predi-
cates occurring in a policy, e.g., the type of the predicate (property type) or
some directives for the verbalization of the predicate which are meant to be
used by the explanation facility (property explanation). Some properties
apply only to provisional predicates: the value of the property ontology is
the identifier of the action associated to the provisional predicate as reported
in some ontology, whereas property actor (resp. execution) specifies which
peer should carry out the action (resp. when the action should be performed)
In the rest of this section a policy fragment will be presented and explained.
The fragment will be exploited in section 5.2 as well.
(1) is colleague(Name)←
(1.1) credential(C),
(1.2) C.type : employee,
(1.3) C.owner : Name,
(1.4) C.issuer : companyXY Z,
(1.5) C.public key : K,
(1.6) challenge(K).
(2) is colleague( )→ type : abbreviation.
(3) credential( )→ type : provisional.
(4) credential( )→ actor : peer.
(5) challenge( )→ type : provisional.
(6) challenge( )→ actor : self.
(7) challenge(K)→ execution : immediate←
ground(K).
This policy fragment contains a rule (1) and six metarules (from (2) to (7)).
The rule states that the predicate is colleague holds if each literal in the body
of the rule holds.
– Metarules (2), (3) and (5) state that predicates credential and challenge,
but not is colleague, are provisional predicates
– Metarule (4) (resp. (6)) states that the action associated to credential (resp.
challenge) must be performed by the other (resp. current) peer. In the fol-
lowing we assume that provisional predicate credential (resp. challenge(K))
is associated to the action of sending a credential to the other peer (resp.
checking whether the other peer is the holder of the public key K through a
standard challenge procedure)
– Metarule (7) states that challenge(K) can be executed if K is ground, i.e.,
instantiated
Assuming that we want to check whether Bob is a colleague, the policy
fragment will be evaluated against the goal is colleague(′Bob′) as follows
– line (1.1) checks whether a credential cred, has been sent by the other peer.
If it is the case the evaluation proceeds, otherwise a failure is reported
– lines from (1.2) to (1.5) check whether the values of the properties of cred
correspond to the ones listed in the body of the rule. If it is the case the
evaluation proceeds, otherwise a failure is reported
– when evaluating line (1.6) the action associated to challenge(key) is exe-
cuted, where key is the public key of cred
5.2 Motivation Scenario (Revisited)
Our running scenario in section 2 contained many policies specified in natural
language. In this section, we formalize them using the Protune policy language
as a proof of concept of its power. It is important to note that users will not be
requested to specify their policies in a rule-based logic language such as Protune.
In contrary, end-users will be able to select and instantiate existing policies from
a standard library2 or, for advanced users, appropriate tools for the specification
of new policies will be provided. In fact, most of the policy languages presented
in section 4 provide management editors that help end-users and administrators
to create and manage their policies.
In our running example Alice needs to specify that during work time her chat
facility must only accept incoming messages from business contacts and other
employees of her company.
Alice:
allow(access(chat(Requester, init conversation)))←
working time(),
is business contact(Requester).
allow(access(chat(Requester, init conversation)))←
working time(),
is colleague(Requester).
allow(access(chat(Requester, init conversation)))←
leisure time().
2 E.g., similar to the mechanisms used in Microsoft Outlook for the instantiation of
filtering rules.
allow(access(chat(Requester,Action)))→ explanation :
Requester & “ can contact Alice for action ′′ & Action.
where working time, leisure time, is business contact and is colleague may be
defined as
Alice (contd.):
working time()←
time(T ),
T > 8 : 30, T < 17 : 00.
leisure time()←
not working time().
is business contact(Name)←
retrieve contact(Name),
Name.category :′ Business′.
is colleague(Name)←
credential(C),
C.type : employee,
C.owner : Name,
C.issuer : companyXY Z,
C.public key : K,
challenge(K).
working time()→ explanation : “It is working time′′.
leisure time()→ explanation : “It is leisure time′′.
time(T )→ explanation : “Time is ′′ & T.
. . .
Specially important in this example is that using Protune, in case Bob, a
friend that studies with Alice, tries to contact her during her working time, an
explanation will be automatically generated from the specified policy [3]. Such
explanation provides natural language statements such as
It can’t be proved that
Bob can contact Alice for action init conversation because
there is no Requester such that
Requester is a business contact [details]
AND
there is no Requester such that
Requester is a colleague in companyXYZ [details]
AND
it is not true that
It is leisure time [details]
In this explanation, statements that are made true and do not depend on
the requester are hidden so the explanation is focused on the conditions which
are not fulfilled (still full explanations providing such details can be generated
too). In addition, clicking on [details] in a line provides a new explanation for
the concept described in such a line. This way end-users may use hyperlinks in
order to explore the proofs generated during the policy evaluation, from a more
general description to a focused explanation of the concepts.
In addition, Alice also has the following policy protecting her credit card
when trying to access on-line resources at different learning resource providers:
Alice (contd.):
allow(access(CC))←
CC.type : credit card,
bbbMember(User).
bbbMember(User)←
credential(C),
C.issuer :′ Better Business Bureau′,
C.name : User,
C.public key : K,
challenge(K).
She finds a course she is interested in and requests access to it. The provider she
is contacting has the following policy:
Learning Provider:
allow(access(Course))←
price(Course, Price),
paid(User, Course, Price).
paid(User,Resource, Price)←
credential(CC),
CC.type : credit card,
CC.owner : User,
authenticated(User),
charged(Resource, Price, CC).
allow(release(credential(bbbCredential))).
When Alice requests access to the course, these two policies raise a dynamic
negotiation (as depicted in figure 2) allowing them to satisfy their respective
policies in an iterative way and successfully perform such an on-line interaction
although they were strangers and had not had any other transaction in common.
6 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, using policy-based behavior control in technology-
enhanced learning environments has not been extensively researched. An ap-
proach aiming at federated access control in web-service based repositories is
Fig. 2. Example negotiation sequence between Alice and the learning provider.
presented in [8]. In order to allow for an appropriate access control, the policy
language XACML and the federated trust framework Shibboleth have been ex-
tended and integrated into an ECL middleware. In this framework, policies are
based on a simple attribute directory service. In LionShare [10], there is a similar
approach exploiting Shibboleth. Security is provided by so-called Access Control
Lists expressed in XACML. These lists define which user can access which file
depending on the users’properties, such as the membership of a certain faculty.
However, none of these approaches allow for expressive access control supporting
e.g., action executions, negotiations or explanations and therefore they do not
meet the requirements identified in our scenario. Furthermore, using Shibboleth
implies the existence of institutions users belong to - which is an assumption
that does not apply in an open scenario for lifelong learning. [6] provides an
abstract overview on privacy and security issues in advanced learning technolo-
gies, suggesting that policies may be used in an educational context. But neither
scenarios nor specific details are provided. [17] deals with policies based on the
Ponder policy language within the scope of collaborative e-learning systems. The
use of policies in such a framework is basically restricted to role-based access con-
trol and therefore does not match the need of an open learning environment as
described above.
7 Conclusions and Further Work
Open lifelong learning environments require flexible and interoperable approaches
which are easy to use and to personalize by learners and tutors. This paper de-
scribes an advanced scenario for collaboration, exchange and utilization of learn-
ing resources. It also shows how policies can naturally address the requirements
extracted from such a scenario providing benefits not only in flexibility and dy-
namicity but also additional features like reasoning and exchangeability. The
paper gives an overview of existing policy frameworks and compares them ac-
cording to the requirements previously identified. Finally, the paper shows how
an existing policy language can be used in order to specify policies that may
be used at runtime to e.g., control access to resources, perform negotiations or
generate explanations.
As part of the TENCompetence project [14], which aims at supporting in-
dividuals, groups and organizations in lifelong competence development, we are
currently working toward the exploitation of policies in order to increase and en-
hance the possibilities the TENCompetence infrastructure provides. According
to the features provided by the different frameworks, we investigate the use Pro-
tune in order to support, among others, negotiations and advanced explanations,
key issues for our open infrastructure.
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